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Better Safe Than Sorry: A Precautionary Toxic 
Substances Control Act Reform Proposal 
Andrew Liebler

 
INTRODUCTION 
It may come as a surprise to most that the majority of the 
chemicals used in everyday consumer products are largely 
untested and loosely regulated. Yet many of these chemicals are 
suspected of causing substantial health and environmental 
problems.
1
 In 2011, the Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC) released an issue paper on disease clusters in the United 
States.
2
 The paper documented the phenomenon of unusually 
large groups of people afflicted with certain diseases in a 
 
  J.D. (2014), Washington University School of Law. Special thanks to my father 
for his guidance on this Note, which is largely the product of a late night phone call and a 
looming deadline. 
 1. See Nicholas Kristof, Op-Ed., How Chemicals Affect Us, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/03/opinion/kristof-how-chemicals-change-us. 
html?_r=0 (noting the growing presence of endocrine-disrupting chemicals in the 
environment, which are suspected of causing breast cancer, infertility, low sperm counts, 
genital deformities, early menstruation, diabetes, and obesity); see also infra note 2, at 
1823–24; Noah M. Sachs, Jumping the Pond: Transnational Law and the Future of 
Chemical Regulation, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1817, 1823–24 (2009) (“[M]ore than 82,000 
synthetic chemicals have been introduced into commerce in the United States, and we 
produce or import over 73 billion pounds of chemicals per day. More than 100,000 
chemicals have been introduced in the EU. Human intake of chemicals is widespread. 
Recent biomonitoring studies, which analyze chemical contaminants in human tissue 
samples, have confirmed that synthetic chemicals are ubiquitous in the human body. 
Industrial chemicals have been identified in the umbilical cord blood of developing 
fetuses and in human breast milk. Chemicals once thought to be safely contained in 
products, such as perfluorinated compounds used in textiles, cookware, and food 
packaging, are now present in virtually all people. And while exposure does not equal 
harm, detailed toxicity data that could connect exposure and harm has been scarce.”). 
 2. KATHLEEN NAVARRO ET AL., NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, HEALTH ALERT: 
DISEASE CLUSTERS SPOTLIGHT THE NEED TO PROTECT PEOPLE FROM TOXIC CHEMICALS 
(2011), available at http://www.nrdc.org/health/diseaseclusters/files/diseaseclusters_issue 
paper.pdf.  
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circumscribed place and time.
3
 These heightened incidences of 
birth defects, cancer, and chronic illness have been linked to the 
presence of various toxic chemicals in the environment and 
consumer products.
4
 These findings become even more shocking 
when considering events such as the 2014 Elk River chemical 
spill in West Virginia, where state officials could not find any 
meaningful safety data on the chemical that contaminated 
drinking water for hundreds of thousands of people.
5
 With the 
increasing attention that is being paid to the common appearance 
of synthetic chemicals—namely, endocrine disruptors—
permanently stored in our bodies, we are just beginning to 
understand the biological effects of these chemicals.
6
 At the 
heart of this problem is the failure of America’s primary 
regulatory safeguard against harmful chemical exposure: the 
Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”).7  
This Note argues that (1) that the current US chemical 
regulatory system should be replaced with a regulatory scheme 
founded on the strong precautionary principle, which places the 
burden on chemical manufacturers to affirmatively prove the 
safety of their chemicals;
8
 (2) that such a scheme will lower the 
 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Pat Rizzuto, Data Deficit on Elk River Chemicals Shows Need for TSCA 
Reform, Legislators Say, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.bna.com/data-
deficit-elk-n17179881899/. In early January 2014, 4-methylcyclohexane methanol 
(MCHM) leaked into the Elk River in West Virginia, contaminating the drinking water 
supply for hundreds of thousands of West Virginians. Id. Subcommittee hearings on the 
topic led to calls for the reform of sections 4 and 8 of TSCA. Id.  
 6. See supra text accompanying note 1; see also Valerie J. Watnick, Our Toxics 
Regulatory System and Why Risk Assessment Does Not Work: Endocrine Disrupting 
Chemicals As A Case In Point, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1305, 1307–10 (2004); THEO 
COLBORN ET AL., OUR STOLEN FUTURE: ARE WE THREATENING OUR FERTILITY, 
INTELLIGENCE, AND SURVIVAL?—A SCIENTIFIC DETECTIVE STORY 106 (1996) 
(“Virtually anyone willing to put up the $2,000 for the tests will find at least 250 
chemical contaminants in his or her body fat, regardless of whether he or she lives in 
Gary, Indiana, or on a remote island in the South Pacific.”). 
 7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692; see generally Applegate, infra note 8 and 
accompanying text; see also infra note 16 and accompanying text.  
 8. For other scholarship recommending this approach, see generally Noah Sachs, 
Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle from Its Critics, 11 U. ILL. L. REV. 1285 
(2011) (embracing the strong precautionary principle as a cornerstone for harm 
prevention in regulatory regimes, including chemical regulation); John S. Applegate, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol46/iss1/15
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demand for chemical safety information needed for regulation 
while incentivizing data production;
9
 (3) that this information 
must be transparent and publicly available for peer-review;
10
 
(4) that there must be an administrative appeals process for 
challenging chemical safety decisions; and (5) that the entire 
scheme must acknowledge both the realities of data shortage and 
the significant demands that these requirements place on the 
chemical manufacturing industry.  
Part I of this Note briefly discusses the current US chemical 
regulatory scheme, TSCA, and its shortcomings, while 
comparing it with Europe’s chemical regulatory system—
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of 
Chemicals (REACH). Part II discusses the importance of two 
cornerstone regulatory components in reforming TSCA: a strong 
precautionary principle and mechanisms to close the data gap. 
Part III advocates for a new chemical regulatory system built on 
the strong precautionary principle as a framework for permitting 
chemical manufacturing. It also advocates for prioritizing 
information generation, reducing the information demands of the 
regulatory system, and maintaining a publicly accessible 
chemical database. Part III also emphasizes the importance of 
 
Synthesizing TSCA and REACH: Practical Principles for Chemical Regulation Reform, 
35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 747 (2008) (comparing TSCA and the European Union’s 
chemical regime, REACH, and describing the desirable traits of REACH that could be 
adopted by a reformed TSCA, including placing an emphasis on harm prevention, 
shifting the burden of proving chemical safety to producers, and reducing the data gap).  
 9. See generally John S. Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap: Balancing the Supply 
and Demand for Chemical Information, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1365 (2008) (discussing the 
various forms of risk-based regulation and the underlying assumptions of those 
regulatory schemes, and advocating for chemical safety data production in order to allow 
risk-based regulation to properly function). 
 10. Creating publicly accessible clearinghouses for chemical data is a frequent 
recommendation of chemical regulation reform advocates. See, e.g., Richard A. Denison, 
Ten Essential Elements in TSCA Reform, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10020, 10026 (2009) 
(advocating for the establishment of a publicly-accessible, transparent database of 
industry-generated safety data, among other things); Applegate, supra note 8, at 766; see 
also CAL. DEP’T OF SUBSTANCE CONTROL, CALIFORNIA GREEN CHEMISTRY INITIATIVE 
FINAL REPORT 27 (2008), available at http://www.dtsc.ca.gov/PollutionPrevention/ 
GreenChemistryInitiatGre/upload/GREEN_Chem.pdf (California’s Green Chemistry 
Initiative is a recent example of a new chemical regulatory system at the State level 
which mandates the creation of an online clearinghouse for chemical safety data).  
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having a flexible appeals system and realistic policy goals given 
the realities and limitations of chemical testing and industrial 
adaptation. While this Note does not purport to specify the exact 
parameters of a new chemical regulatory system, it does assert a 
number of important principles that should form the foundation 
of a new system.  
I. A PRIMER ON CHEMICAL REGULATION 
A. The History and Failures of TSCA  
In 1971, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 
released a report entitled “Toxic Substances.”11 The report 
detailed the need for toxic chemical regulation and became a 
basis for enacting TSCA.
12
 The report noted that (1) toxic 
substances are entering the environment; (2) these substances 
can have severe effects; (3) existing legal authorities are 
inadequate; and (4) new legal authority is required.
13
 In response, 
TSCA was enacted in 1976 “to regulate chemical substances and 
mixtures which present an unreasonable risk of injury to health 
or the environment, and to take action with respect to chemical 
substances and mixtures which are imminent hazards.”14 Under 
TSCA, once the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finds 
an “unreasonable risk” to human health or the environment, the 
agency can impose a wide variety of regulations on the 
 
 11. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, TOXIC SUBSTANCES 105 (1971), available at 
http://digitool.library.colostate.edu///exlibris/dtl/d3_1/apache_media/L2V4bGlicmlzL2R0
bC9kM18xL2FwYWNoZV9tZWRpYS8yMjExODQ=.pdf. 
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. at 105–06.  
 14. 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2006). After TSCA’s enactment, the CEQ explained its 
vision for TSCA’s system of regulation. “Manufacturers must give notice of plans to 
produce a new chemical or to market a significant new use for an old chemical. Producers 
may also be required to test selected chemicals or to report production quantities, uses, 
physical, chemical, and biological properties, and other information necessary for hazard 
assessment. In addition, the law requires recordkeeping and disclosure of significant 
health effects of dangerous chemicals.” COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY: THE EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY 5 (1977). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol46/iss1/15
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chemical.
15
 While this system may seem prudent on its face, in 
practice, the scheme is severely undermined. In fact, as early as 
1980, the General Accounting Office (GAO) stated that “neither 
the public nor the environment are much better protected” under 
TSCA than without it.
16
  
First, TSCA gives new and existing chemicals a “strong 
presumption of innocence.”17 Under this presumption, the EPA 
must affirmatively find that a chemical presents an unreasonable 
risk to human health or the environment before regulating it.
18
 A 
number of studies, however, have shown that an affirmative 
requirement to show unreasonable risk is problematic.
19
 Several 
governmental and non-governmental organization studies have 
revealed that toxicity data, which is required to show that a risk 
exists, is lacking, even for widely used chemicals.
20
  
 
 15. TSCA’s functionality and regulation mechanisms are laid out in subsection (a) 
of 15 U.S.C. § 2605. Subsection (a) reads:  
If the Administrator finds that there is a reasonable basis to conclude that the 
manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of a 
chemical substance or mixture, or that any combination of such activities, 
presents or will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the 
environment, the Administrator shall by rule apply one or more of the following 
requirements to such substance or mixture to the extent necessary to protect 
adequately against such risk using the least burdensome requirements. . . . 
15 U.S.C. § 2605 (2012). Once the EPA Administrator makes a finding of unreasonable 
risk, the Administrator may propose a wide number of regulatory requirements including 
prohibitions, limitations, and labeling requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a). 
 16. See Charles Franklin, TSCA Reform Versus Replacement: Moving Forward in 
the Chemical Control Debate, 44 ABA TRENDS 9, 10 (2013) (quoting the GAO’s 
analysis of TSCA’s failures and explaining multiple factors for the failure of TSCA 
including staffing and budget shortfalls). 
 17. For a discussion of this presumption of innocence and its effects on TSCA’s 
functionality, see Denison, supra note 10. 
 18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601(b)(2), 2604(a). 
 19. See supra Applegate note 8; Denison, note 10; infra note 107. 
 20. See infra notes 115–19. A particularly revealing quote by a Senior 
Environmental Defense attorney, David Roe, illustrates the situation: “In 1997–98, 
however, the assumption that we have any real grasp of which chemicals are toxics was 
definitively shattered . . . . The studies’ [conducted by Environmental Defense, EPA, and 
the Chemical Manufacturers Association] implications were acutely unsettling: in a 
regulatory system that depends on identifying target chemicals before regulating them, 
less than 10% of the largest potential targets had been properly scanned for toxic effects.” 
David Roe, Ready or Not: The Coming Wave of Toxic Chemicals, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 623, 
627–28 (2002).  
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Second, TSCA requires a showing that a chemical poses an 
unreasonable risk to health and the environment before 
mandatory action can be taken.
21
 This standard has become 
nearly unattainable under current judicial interpretation.
22
 In 
addition, any calculation of unreasonable risk by the EPA must 
consider the economic costs of regulating the chemical, the 
impact of regulation on small businesses and chemical 
development, any alternatives to the chemical, and the social 
benefits of the chemical.
23
 The EPA must also demonstrate that 
the form of regulation proposed for the chemical is the least 
burdensome option and that no other federal statute can be used 
to regulate the chemical.
24
  
In conjunction with the presumption of innocence for 
chemicals, the complexity and stringent requirements of the 
unreasonable risk standard makes mandatory chemical regulation 
under TSCA a difficult task. TSCA’s “substantial evidence” 
 
 21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601(b)(2), 2604(a). 
 22. See infra notes 104–07 and accompanying text; see also Applegate, supra note 
8, at 736–37 (2008) (describing the unattainable interpretation of the unreasonable risk 
standard). 
 23. Subsection (c) of § 2605 reads,  
(1) In promulgating any rule under subsection (a) of this section with respect to 
a chemical substance or mixture, the Administrator shall consider and publish a 
statement with respect to—(A) the effects of such substance or mixture on 
health and the magnitude of the exposure of human beings to such substance or 
mixture, (B) the effects of such substance or mixture on the environment and the 
magnitude of the exposure of the environment to such substance or mixture, (C) 
the benefits of such substance or mixture for various uses and the availability of 
substitutes for such uses, and (D) the reasonably ascertainable economic 
consequences of the rule, after consideration of the effect on the national 
economy, small business, technological innovation, the environment, and public 
health.  
15 U.S.C. §2605(c)(1) (2012). See also Denison, supra note 10, at 10021–22. 
Environmental scholar Richard A. Denison notes that “[t]he result of [this regime] is a 
blurring together of what should be two distinct questions: Does a chemical pose a 
significant risk? If so, what should be done about it?” Id. at 10022. Denison explains that 
“TSCA precludes EPA from identifying a chemical that poses a significant risk unless it 
can also demonstrate that the risk could be or is unreasonable.” Id. “In what amounts to a 
classic Catch-22, government must already have information sufficient to document 
potential risk, or at the very least, extensive exposure, in order to require the 
development of information sufficient to determine whether there is actual risk.” 
(emphasis in original). Id. at 10020.  
 24. See 15 U.S.C. § 2608 (2012).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol46/iss1/15
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requirement for sustaining EPA action upon judicial review, 
instead of the more common and deferential “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard, is a further barrier to effective regulation.25 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the unreasonable risk burden “is so high 
that in the 32 years since TSCA was enacted, the EPA has 
required testing for only about 200 chemicals.”26 The result of 
this scheme has been far from the vision depicted by the statute’s 
authors.
27
 
B. The History and Practice of the European Approach,  REACH 
1. The Provisions of REACH Generally 
In 2006, the European Union enacted its own chemical 
regulation regime called REACH.
28
 Taking cues from the 
failures of TSCA, REACH regulates chemicals by placing an 
affirmative burden to prove chemical safety on chemical 
 
 25. See 15 U.S.C. § 2618 (2012); see also Franklin, supra note 16, at 4.  
 26. Denison, supra note 10, at 10020; see also ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
OVERVIEW: OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION AND TOXICS PROGRAMS 4 (2007), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/oppt/pubs/oppt101c2.pdf. 
 27. See Sachs, supra note 1, at 1818. Noah Sachs, an environmental law professor 
at Richmond University School of Law, has discussed this failure at length. Sachs notes 
that “[TSCA] lacks the sharp regulatory bite of most U.S. environmental laws. Virtually 
every expert panel that has examined the U.S. system of chemical regulation has 
concluded that it inadequately protects public health and the environment. Yet despite a 
chorus of criticism and growing concern over the health effects of chemical exposure, 
TSCA has been remarkably resistant to reform. It is among the weakest, and the least 
amended, of all of the federal environmental statutes.” Id.  
 28. Commission Regulation 1907/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 136) 3 [referred to in this 
article as REACH]. The EU’s website for the REACH program describes the EU’s goals 
and rationale for the program: “One of the main reasons for developing and adopting the 
REACH Regulation was that a large number of substances have been manufactured and 
placed on the market in Europe for many years, sometimes in very high amounts, and yet 
there is insufficient information on the hazards that they pose to human health and the 
environment. There is a need to fill these information gaps to ensure that industry is able 
to assess hazards and risks of the substances, and to identify and implement the risk 
management measures to protect humans and the environment.” What is REACH?, 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (last visited May 6, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ 
chemicals/reach/reach_en.htm. Clearly, the motivations for REACH seem much the same 
as those for TSCA. But REACH operates by using a much more effective regulatory 
mechanism. 
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manufacturers.
29
 REACH requires that “chemical risks should be 
controlled, eliminated, mitigated, or justified by their creators.”30 
Instead of a presumption of innocence for unknown or new 
chemicals, REACH requires firms to test the safety of all 
chemicals in use for which there is insufficient toxicity 
information.
31
 REACH also requires minimum toxicity data for 
old and new chemicals, and aims to build the largest toxicity data 
bank in history.
32
 These components are supported by REACH’s 
“No Data, No Market” principle—if a company fails to submit 
the required chemical testing and registration data designated by 
REACH, it is denied access to the EU’s now $558 billion 
chemical market.
33
  
 
 29. See Sachs, supra note 1, at 1821. “REACH, in contrast to TSCA, frames 
incentives in favor of research and disclosure by making the provision of toxicity data a 
condition of access to the $537 billion European chemical market—the largest in the 
world. REACH also shifts certain burdens of proof from government to industry, makes 
some hazardous chemicals subject to government authorization, and focuses 
systematically on identifying and promoting safer substitutes for hazardous chemicals.” 
Id. Sachs also notes the influence of REACH beyond the borders of the EU, an effect 
called the “California effect.” Id. at 1850–51. “While REACH still faces significant 
challenges, this next-generation chemical regulation is likely to increase, at reasonable 
cost, protections for public health and the environment relative to U.S. law.” Id. at 1822. 
See also Andrew Austin, Out of Reach? Effects of the EU’s New Chemicals Regime, 49 
No. 12 DRI FOR DEF. 64 (2007) (discussing the requirements of REACH and positing 
that “REACH is the most comprehensive chemicals regime in the world, and is likely to 
be one of the most burdensome with which to comply.”).  
 30. See Applegate, supra note 8, at 746.  
 31. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 28. The European Union’s website for 
the REACH program also notes that “[m]anufacturers and importers are required to 
gather information on the properties of their chemical substances, which will allow their 
safe handling, and to register the information in a central database run by the European 
Chemicals Agency (ECHA) in Helsinki.” Id.  
 32. See EUROPEAN COMM’N ENV’T DIRECTORATE GENERAL, REACH IN BRIEF 6-
16 (2007), available at http://www.hse.gov.uk/reach/resources/inbrief.pdf [hereinafter 
REACH IN BRIEF]; see also ECHEMPORTAL, http://www.echemportal.org/echemportal/ 
substancesearch/ page.action?pageID=1 (last visited Feb. 18, 2014) (current chemical 
database that the European Union maintains, now linked to many other such databases); 
ESIS: European Chemical Substances Information System, EUROPEAN COMM’N JOINT 
RESEARCH CTR. INST. FOR HEALTH AND CONSUMER PROT., http://esis.jrc.ec.europa.eu 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2014) (current chemical database for the European Union Chemicals 
Bureau). 
 33. See REACH, supra note 28 at Art. 5. See also THE EUROPEAN CHEM. INDUS. 
COUNCIL (CEFIC), The European Chemical Industry, Facts & Figures 2013 (Jan. 2014), 
available at http://asp.zone-secure.net/v2/index.jsp?id=598/765/42548; Sachs, supra note 
1, at 1835. Sachs notes that “The ‘No Data, No Market’ principle is already making 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol46/iss1/15
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REACH administers these components through its 
registration and authorization processes.
34
 Unlike TSCA, 
REACH identifies chemicals of concern and gives them a 
deadline to register for authorization and proof of safety.
35
 After 
this initial step, REACH allows manufacturers to justify their 
chemicals’ use in the authorization stage and meet their 
affirmative burden of proving safe use.
36
 For instance, REACH 
gives so-called chemicals of “very high concern” (VHCs) an 
effective deadline (a “sunset date”) by which they must be 
removed from the European market unless they receive 
government authorization.
37
 These chemicals can be authorized 
“if the applicant can demonstrate that the risk from the use of the 
substance is adequately controlled.”38 The chemical 
manufacturing industry may receive time extensions for these 
deadlines if they show (1) that the social and economic benefits 
of the chemical outweigh the risks they pose, and (2) that there is 
no suitable substitute for the chemical.
39
 Through this process, 
 
toxicity testing a routine part of doing business in Europe, rather than the exception, as it 
is in the United States. Firms have an incentive to generate the toxicity data that will 
allow their products to undergo registration as quickly as possible. The system rewards 
knowledge, rather than ignorance.” Id.  
 34. See REACH, L 136 at Arts. 5–7. See also REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 32, at 
6–13.  
 35. For an overview of the registration and authorization timeline imposed by 
REACH, see EUROPEAN CHEMS. AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION 48–50 (2012), 
available at https://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13632/registration_en.pdf. 
 36. For an overview of the authorization process, see Authorisation, EUROPEAN 
CHEMS. AGENCY, http://echa.europa.eu/regulations/reach/authorization (last visited June 
8, 2014). 
 37. See REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 32, at 12–13. See also Sachs, supra note 1, at 
1837–38. Chemicals of “very high concern” (“VHC’s”) include carcinogens, chemicals 
that cause birth defects and genetic mutations, and chemicals that are bioaccumulative 
and remain in the environment for sustained periods of time. REACH, L 136 at Art. 57. 
The language of REACH, art. 57 explains these VHC’s include “[c]arcinogenic, 
mutagenic, or reprotoxic substances”. REACH, L 136 at Art. 57. See also REACH IN 
BRIEF, supra note 32, at 18 (stating REACH authorization approval and revocation 
procedures and defining chemicals of “very high concern”). 
 38. REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 32, at 13.  
 39. See REACH, L 136 at Art. 60(4). The substitution component of REACH 
authorization is important and aims to “ensure that substances of high concern are 
eventually replaced by less dangerous substances or technologies where suitable 
economically and technically viable alternatives are available.” Id. at para. 12. In line 
with this goal, the chemical authorization process requires manufacturers of VHC’s to 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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REACH ensures that chemical risks are known and accounted 
for before those chemicals find their way into the market. 
2. Risk Disclosure Under REACH 
REACH also increases chemical safety awareness among 
downstream chemical users (e.g., common consumers and 
producers using chemicals in their manufacturing processes) by 
requiring that chemical manufacturers (1) disclose who their 
downstream users are; (2) notify them of the risks posed by each 
chemical they provide; and (3) identify chemical management 
techniques.
40
 In addition, downstream users of chemicals may 
only use them for purposes approved by the government in the 
authorization process.
41
 Downstream users must report any 
hazards they discover in using the chemicals to the manufacturer 
and notify the manufacturer if their risk management guidelines 
are inadequate.
42
 REACH also contains significant provisions for 
disclosing chemical safety information to the public. Unlike 
TSCA, REACH creates an online database of chemical toxicity 
information for the public.
43
 In addition, REACH allows 
consumers to demand safety information from chemical 
suppliers.
44
 In many ways, REACH provides a useful model for 
future chemical regulatory systems. In particular, REACH 
demonstrates the benefits of incorporating the “precautionary 
 
prepare analyses that consider alternative substitutes for the VHC chemical, the risks of 
their use, and the feasibility of using them as substitutes. Id. at Art. 62(4)(e). If a feasible 
substitute is found, the European Commission will consider the benefits of the substitute 
and can mandate that the substitute be used. Id. at Art. 62(4)(f), 60(5)(a). See also 
REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 32, at 8 (noting that “the increased accountability of 
downstream users and better public information will create a strong demand for substitute 
chemicals that have been sufficiently tested and that are safe for the envisages use.”). 
This system of checking for substitutes and using them if they are available is a key 
component of REACH’s promotion of the safest possible chemicals in the European 
Market, to the exclusion of VHC’s wherever possible.  
 40. See REACH, arts. 31–32.  
 41. See REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 32, at 11.  
 42. See REACH, art. 37.  
 43. See REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 32, at 15; see also REACH, art. 77(2)(e). 
 44. See REACH, art. 33. These requests must be fulfilled by product suppliers if 
they contain more than 0.1% by weight of any substance that has undergone the REACH 
authorization process. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol46/iss1/15
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principle,” chemical data generation, public access and 
transparency, and staggered implementation into a chemical 
regulatory scheme.  
II. THE TWO CORNERSTONE ELEMENTS OF U.S. CHEMICAL 
REFORM 
Chemical regulatory reform is a realistic possibility. As 
demonstrated by recent developments in the Senate, including 
the late Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-RI) and Senator David 
Vitter’s (R-LA) efforts to champion chemical reform. The 
primary blueprint for TSCA reform that currently has the most 
political traction in Congress is the Chemical Safety 
Improvement Act (CSIA), introduced by Senators Lautenberg 
and Vitter.
45
 In many ways, the CSIA represents a compromise 
between industry, environmentalists, consumer-protection 
advocates, and regulators.
46
 The general consensus is that the 
CSIA represents the best chance of reforming TSCA in the 37 
years since TSCA’s enactment.47 Still, there are significant 
disagreements over how a new regulatory scheme should be 
 
 45. S. 1009, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ 
BILLS-113s1009is/pdf/BILLS-113s1009is.pdf; see The Chemical Safety Improvement 
Act: Hearing on S. 1009 Before the Subcomm. on Environment and the Economy of the 
H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 113th Cong. (2013) (statements of Sen. Frank 
Lautenberg and Sen. David Vitter), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/ 
hearing/s-1009-chemical-safety-improvement-act. 
 46. See Chemicals Policy Reform, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, 
http://www.edf.org/ health/policy/chemicals-policy-reform (last accessed June 8, 2015) 
(referring to the CSIA as a “compromise bill” with strengths and weaknesses and 
suggesting possible improvements to the bill); see also The Chemical Safety Improvement 
Act: An In-Depth Review and Analysis, BERGESON & CAMPBELL, P.C., http://www.law 
bc.com/regulatory-developments/entry/the-chemical-safety-improvement-act-an-in-depth 
-review-and-analysis/ (last visited June 8, 2014) (describing the substantive changes the 
CSIA would make to TSCA including in the areas of chemical testing and regulatory 
thresholds). 
 47. See Chemicals Policy Reform, supra note 46; see also “ACC to Congress: It’s 
Time to Update TSCA, Pass the Chemical Safety Improvement Act (CSIA)”, AMERICAN 
CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, http://www.americanchemistry.com/Media/PressReleasesTranscripts/ 
ACC-news-releases/ACC-to-Congress-Its-Time-to-Update-TSCA-Pass-the-Chemical-Safety-
Improvement-Act-CSIA.html (last accessed June 8, 2014) (noting the historic bipartisan 
support for the bill and compromises made in the bill). 
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constructed and operated.
48
 Despite marked progress, the 
specifics of the next US chemical regulatory system—if one is 
indeed created—remain unclear.  
This Note focuses on five essential components of a new and 
effective chemical regulatory system. These components are 
(1) a “strong precautionary principle”; (2) prioritizing data 
generation while reducing demands for chemical data; (3) public 
transparency; (4) a flexible appeals process for industry; and 
(5) sensible acknowledgement of the realities and regulatory 
demands of chemical testing. Two of these components—the 
“strong precautionary principle” and closing the “data gap” by 
increasing chemical data supply while reducing data demand—
should form the foundation of a new proposed regime.  
A. Embracing the “Strong Precautionary Principle”  
The precautionary principle is a cornerstone element of many 
international regulatory regimes, including REACH. As applied, 
the principle generally holds that the regulation of anticipated 
risks from a chemical should be allowed to proceed even in the 
face of scientific uncertainty. There are two interpretations of the 
principle—the “weak” and “strong” precautionary principles.49 
The “weak” version was most famously defined in the United 
Nations 1992 Rio Declaration, which held that “[w]here there are 
 
 48. One of the most significant CSIA debates involves preemption. As noted, 
California has enacted the Green Chemistry Initiative, which places significant 
regulations on chemicals sold in California and—by virtue of its market share—the 
greater United States. See CALIFORNIA GREEN CHEMISTRY INITIATIVE FINAL REPORT, 
supra note 10. Industry advocates want a new federal chemical scheme to preempt any 
current State regulations, which could be more stringent than the regulations imposed 
under the CSIA. See “Panelists at Hearing Express Optimism that a Compromise on 
TSCA Modernization can be Reached but Substantial Policy Differences Remain”, 
MCKENNA, LONG & ALDRIDGE, http://www.mckennalong.com/ publications-advisories-
3447.html (last visited June 8, 2014) (describing divisions in support regarding CSIA 
preemption). This proposition is unpopular with the Senate’s Environment and Public 
Works Committee Chair, Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA). See Strengthening Public 
Health Protections by Addressing Toxic Chemicals Threats: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Sen. 
Barbara Boxer), available at http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction= 
Hearings.Statement& Statement_ID=c5097f2c-aeed-469c-8f19-f6c741efa550. 
 49. See generally Sachs, supra note 8. 
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threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”50 This 
version is considered “weak” because it is permissive and 
doesn’t require that any precautionary actions actually be taken 
by the government. Because of this, critics of the “weak” 
principle often describe it as a mere truism.
51
 On the other hand, 
the “strong precautionary principle” holds that some regulation 
should automatically be undertaken in the face of serious risks, 
despite scientific uncertainty.
52
 In conjunction, the “strong” 
principle places a burden on the proponent of the risky activity to 
prove that the risks are reasonable and justified.
53
 The drug 
 
 50. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 
Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 15, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (June 14, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 (1992). 
 51. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 
1003, 1016 (Jan. 2003) (“The weak versions of the precautionary principle state a truism, 
one that is uncontroversial and necessary only to combat public confusion or the self-
interested claims of private groups demanding unambiguous evidence of harm, which no 
rational society requires.”); see also Edward Soule, Assessing the Precautionary 
Principle, 14 PUB. AFF. Q. 309, 315 (2000).  
 52. According to Sachs, “the Strong Precautionary Principle suggests that some 
precautionary regulation should be a default response to serious risks under conditions of 
scientific uncertainty.” Sachs, supra note 8, at 1295. Regulation can cover a wide 
spectrum of responses—from labeling to use restrictions to outright bans. Id. See also 
Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1018 (“[The Strong Precautionary Principle suggests] that 
regulation is required whenever there is a possible risk to health, safety, or the 
environment, even if the supporting evidence is speculative and even if the economic 
costs of regulation are high.”); WINGSPREAD STATEMENT ON THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE, PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 353–54 (Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel A. Tickner eds., 
1999) (a document supportive of a strong precautionary principle adopted in 1998 that 
reads, “[w]hen an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, 
precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause-and-effect relationships are 
not fully established scientifically. In this context the proponent of an activity, rather than 
the public should bear the burden of proof.”). As Sachs points out, while the Wingspread 
Statement is useful in understanding “strong precaution”, the Statement uses an 
unbounded definition of “threats.” See Sachs, supra note 8, at 1296. This means that in 
practice, the Wingspread Statement calls for the regulation of almost every activity—
even trivial ones. Instead, as Sach’s points out, only “serious” threats should be regulated 
under “strong precaution” in order to prevent against congestion of the regulatory system 
with trivial “threats.” Id. 
 53. See Justin Wade, Sunstein’s Blunder; Or, The Perils of Reconstructing 
Precaution, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 473, 485 (2008) (“Whereas the weak 
Precautionary Principle operates temporally by allowing action before full certainty, the 
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approval process of the Federal Drug Administration (FDA), 
which is detailed later in this Note, is an example of the “strong 
precautionary principle” in action.54 
The “strong precautionary principle” does not prescribe any 
particular regulatory response in the face of serious risk.
55
 
Instead, the principle simply establishes a norm for regulatory 
decision-making.
56
 There may, of course, be considerable 
variance in a government’s definition of “serious risk” and the 
default regulations imposed under a strong precautionary 
scheme.
57
 Regardless, a strong precautionary scheme positions 
government as a preventative “gatekeeper” that forces the risk 
creator to justify the risk created.
58
 
The “strong” version of the precautionary principle has been 
significantly criticized.
59
 Some critics contend that strong 
precaution stifles technological growth and paralyzes 
regulators.
60
 Critics also claim that the principle requires 
manufacturers to show “zero risk” from their activities—an 
unfeasible requirement.
61
 In fact, critics cast the strong version of 
the principle as prohibiting any amount of activity that carries 
risk.
62
 Instead of strong precaution, many critics call for cost-
 
‘strong’ Precautionary Principle can be thought of in burden-shifting terms: a plausibly 
risky technology, such as genetic engineering, is considered presumptively unsafe until 
the manufacturer can prove the extent of the risk the technology poses to human or 
environmental health.”). 
 54. See infra note 95.  
 55. See Sachs, supra note 8, at 1293–94.  
 56. Id. at 1295.  
 57. Id. at 1298; see also REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 32, at 4–6 (describing 
different default regulatory responses for “very high concern” chemicals versus others 
not classified as such).  
 58. See Sachs, supra note 8, at 1298.  
 59. Id. at 1299; see also Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1018–20; Cross, infra note 60.  
 60. See Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1020; see also Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical 
Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851 (1996) (generally 
criticizing the precautionary principle as stifling technological development and 
regulatory action).  
 61. See Lawrence A. Kogan, The Extra-WTO Precautionary Principle: One 
European “Fashion” Export The United States Can Do Without, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L REV. 491, 517 (2008).  
 62. See id. 
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benefit or risk analysis by the government for each regulatory 
decision.
63
 
Some criticism of the “precautionary principle” deserves 
attention.
64
 These arguments are that: (1) the precautionary 
principle causes “opportunity benefits” to be lost;65 (2) the 
precautionary principle structurally reinforces the problematic 
tendency to neglect the probability of a negative event’s 
occurrence and protect against that event without regard to the 
side effects of regulation;
66
 and (3) the strong version of the 
precautionary principle paralyzes scientific and technological 
development.
67
 Cass Sunstein’s article—Beyond the 
Precautionary Principle—does a thorough job of explaining 
these arguments.
68
  
First, Sunstein argues that in some cases “regulation 
eliminates the ‘opportunity benefits’ of a process or activity, and 
thus causes preventable deaths.”69 Sunstein points to “drug 
lag”—caused by our highly precautionary approach to approving 
drugs only after testing has proved safety—as an example of 
this.
70
 Sunstein argues that this precautionary approach may 
protect people by demanding extensive drug testing, but it 
simultaneously prevents people from receiving the benefits of 
 
 63. See Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1056–57. Valerie Watnick offers an interesting 
response—using endocrine disrupting chemicals as an example—to critics of the 
precautionary principle who instead argue for solely risk-based chemical regulation. See 
generally Watnick, supra note 6. 
 64. Cass Sunstein’s Beyond the Precautionary Principle provides a thorough 
collection of arguments against the precautionary principle and accounting of why—in 
his opinion—the principle seems so appealing. See generally Sunstein, supra note 51. 
Grappling with the entirety of Professor Sunstein’s paper is outside of the scope of this 
Note, but, I have tried to select and address a few of his points. 
 65. See Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1023. 
 66. See id. at 1010, 1036–54. 
 67. See id. at 1020–29. 
 68. See Sunstein supra note 51. Sunstein’s article opposing the strong precautionary 
principle is one of the most thorough that I have read and serves as an excellent catalog 
of many criticisms of the principle. But, Sunstein’s criticism of the strong precautionary 
principle can also be used to ensure that a precautionary chemical regime is effective 
while guarding against the evils of which he speaks. For more criticism of the 
precautionary principle, see supra notes 60, 61. 
 69. Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1023 (citing AARON WILDAVSKY, SEARCHING FOR 
SAFETY 48–50 (1988)). 
 70. Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1023.  
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those drugs until they are approved.
71
 Sunstein also offers the 
example of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in food, 
which could potentially produce higher yields of cheaper, 
healthier foods.
72
 Sunstein implies that a precautionary approach 
to the uncertain health effects of GMOs could result in 
“numerous deaths, and a small probability of many more.”73 
Second, Sunstein argues that among other things, “probability 
neglect” and “system neglect” could lead to unwise decision-
making in the name of precaution.
74
 He argues that our tendency 
to focus on emotional reactions to possible harms rather than the 
probability of those harms happening distorts effective decision-
making—sometimes at considerable expense.75 Next, he claims 
that when trying to address a perceived risk, we typically 
disregard the problems created by addressing the initial risk.
76
 In 
other words, when one set of potentially improbable risks are 
addressed, we frequently create another set of new risks.
77
 
Third, Sunstein argues that the precautionary principle is 
actually paralyzing as a regulatory scheme because it attempts to 
prevent all risk despite the fact that risks are inherent in any 
regulatory decision—including inaction.78 Sunstein says that “if 
the precautionary principle is taken in its strongest form, it is 
offended by regulation as well as by nonregulation.”79 Sunstein 
argues that this is true in light of the previous two points: by 
regulating potentially beneficial and life-saving technologies, we 
guard against one set of risks, but we also welcome another set 
of risks.
80
 Under this reasoning, if regulation causes harm and 
lack of regulation causes harm, then the strong precautionary 
 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 1023–24. 
 73. Id. at 1023; Sunstein points to Bill Lambrecht, Dinner at the New Gene Café, as 
a general source for this contention and the varied objections to genetic modification. See 
generally BILL LAMBRECHT, DINNER AT THE NEW GENE CAFÉ (2001). 
 74. Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1044–54. 
 75. Id. at 1044–49. 
 76. Id. at 1049–54. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1020–29.  
 79. Id. at 1024. 
 80. See generally id. at 1023.  
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principle—a system based on prohibiting the introduction of any 
new harm into the world—is paralyzing.81 According to 
Sunstein, “[t]he precautionary principle appears to offer 
guidance only because people blind themselves to certain aspects 
of the risk situation, focusing on a mere subset of the hazards 
that are at stake.”82  
These three arguments have merit and deserve attention in the 
crafting of a strong precautionary chemical regulatory scheme. 
But in the context of this proposal, these arguments fall short in 
many respects. As an initial matter, the strong precautionary 
principle is often cast as far more extreme than it actually is. 
Strong precaution—as applied by a sensible, realistic regime—
does not prohibit all risky activities or require a showing of “zero 
risk” by the proponent of an activity.83 Instead, the principle 
requires that the government establish a tolerable amount of risk 
allowed for a given activity.
84
 If an activity poses more risk than 
the amount tolerated, then it must face at least some regulation as 
a default. The regulation need not be a blanket prohibition, as 
many critics imply.
85
 The regulation instead could be as simple 
as usage restrictions, warning labels, or marketing restrictions.
86
 
With these in place, the burden is squarely on the risk creator to 
demonstrate that the risks are justified by the benefits.
87
 Rather 
 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 1054–55.  
 83. In fact, if complete risk aversion were the case, a chemical regulatory system 
based on this type of principle would be paralyzing. The length of time needed to 
completely study the generational and synergistic effects of a chemical and then deem it 
to pose “zero risk” would theoretically grind chemical use to a halt for decades. The 
absurdity of this “straw man” version of the strong precautionary principle is obvious. 
See also Sachs, supra note 8, at 1305 (Sunstein and other scholars, however, have 
consistently criticized the Principle, rejecting it as paralyzing, inflexible, and extreme. 
However, the Principle does not call for the elimination of all risk, nor does it ignore 
trade-offs, as Sunstein has alleged. Rather, through burden shifting, the Principle simply 
requires risk creators to justify the risks they impose on society.).  
 84. See Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1054–55.  
 85. See id. at 1014; cf. Sachs, supra note 8, at 1312.  
 86. For instance, TSCA allows for a wide variety of regulatory action to be taken, 
including prohibitions, manufacturing and use limitations, and warning label 
requirements. See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a). 
 87. This is the same general framework that occurs in REACH’s handling of 
VHC’s. See REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 32, at 12–14. 
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than forcing the government to abandon “sound science,” 
“strong precaution” actually encourages industry to develop 
more scientific data and chemical knowledge.
 88
  
Against this backdrop, Sunstein’s first argument—that 
foregone “opportunity benefits” lost by regulation of perceived 
risk only exchanges one harm for another begins to unravel. 
With a general lack of knowledge, and in many cases a complete 
absence of scientific data about chemical harms and benefits, a 
reasonable analysis of “opportunity benefits” in comparison to 
costs is impossible.
89
 But this is likely what Sunstein would have 
a chemical regime do.
90
 It makes no sense then to err on the side 
 
 88. See Joseph Bast, President, The Heartland Inst., Speech to Responsible Industry 
for a Sound Environment (RISE): Whatever Happened To Sound Science? (Sept. 5, 
2007) (transcript available at http://heartland.org/sites/all/modules/custom/heartland_ 
migration/files/pdfs/22010.pdf) (speaking on behalf of the Heartland Institute to a 
collection of industry leaders decrying the lack of “sound science” and reliance of “junk 
science” in criticisms of global warming, second hand smoke, and pesticides); cf. Justin 
Gillis, Study Affirms Consensus On Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2010, 
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/evidence-for-a-consensus-on-climate-change/ 
(describing overwhelming consensus among peer-reviewed scientists on anthropogenic 
climate change); see generally William R.L. Anderegg et al., Expert Credibility In 
Climate Change, PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. (Apr. 9, 2010), 
http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2010/06/04/1003187107.full.pdf+html (describing the 
scientific consensus regarding climate change).  
 89. In fact, that is precisely why we require extensive testing of drugs and 
medicines. It is important to note that Sunstein’s main point is not that opportunity 
benefits are foregone per se, but that foregoing those benefits creates a harm just as 
failing to regulate would. See Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1024. As I have explained, the 
strong precautionary principle is not so overly rigid as to be paralyzed by this “damned if 
you do, damned if you don’t” reasoning. Instead, I argue that at this stage, we cannot 
fairly compare these tradeoffs and the principle will help us generate the information to 
do so. Once we have actual data to use in the comparisons, we will be much better 
equipped to use and manage chemicals in a way that maximizes their benefits and isolates 
their harms.  
 90. In fact, a probable model for chemical regulation under Sunstein’s regime 
sounds a lot like TSCA. See Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1053–54. In discussing pesticide 
regulation, Sunstein dismisses the precautionary principle “in its most aggressive form” 
as a bad idea. Id. at 1053. Setting aside Sunstein’s overly rigid interpretation of the strong 
precautionary principle, his alternative regime for pesticide regulation sounds quite 
familiar. Sunstein says, “it would be far more sensible to adopt a precautionary approach 
to those pesticides that appear, on the basis of existing evidence, to create a significant 
risk of harm, even if that risk cannot be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. 
(emphasis added). After acknowledging pesticide regulation to embody the “weak” 
version of the precautionary principle, Sunstein notes,  
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of including “opportunity benefits” instead of protecting against 
potential risks when we have as little data about chemicals as we 
do. Instead, we should create strong incentives to fill in the gaps 
in our knowledge until we can make sensible decisions about 
chemical safety. Adoption of the strong precautionary principle 
in chemical regulation recognizes this reality 
Sunstein’s second argument, however, is very useful in the 
context of chemical regulation. Sunstein calls attention to our 
disregard of the actual probability of, and overreaction to, 
viscerally negative events occurring.
91
 This is a valid concern in 
the context of chemical production. For instance, concern with 
bioaccumulative chemicals and purported “endocrine disrupting 
chemicals”—despite our relative ignorance about the probability 
of harm from these chemicals—demonstrates Sunstein’s point.92 
Indeed, this Note—a call for regulatory safeguards against these 
possible harms—is evidence of such a response. But this is why 
an information-generating chemical regime is so important, so 
that future regulatory responses can be tailored to accurate 
determinations of probable harm. In order to minimize the 
adverse “systemic” effects that Sunstein warns of, we can lessen 
the burden of such a scheme using tools like the ones described 
in Part III of this Note.  
These responses also speak to Sunstein’s third argument: that 
the strong precautionary principle is paralyzing. At present, 
 
“Even if significant risks can be found, it is also important to identify the risks 
associated with the substitutes for those pesticides, and to know whether those 
risks are also to be controlled if they are significant. After assessing the relevant 
risks, it remains to consider the economic costs of restrictions, as indeed existing 
law requires . . .” 
Id. (emphasis added, referring to the current TSCA regime). Our experience with TSCA 
thus far should counsel against this sort of approach. For an extended discussion of the 
flaws with this risk-based system in the context of chemical regulation, see generally 
Watnick, supra note 6.  
 91. See Sunstein, supra note 51 at 1044. 
 92. There is much scientific uncertainty about whether bioaccumulative chemicals 
or suspected endocrine disruptors are harmful in the first place. See Noah Sachs, Blocked 
Pathways: Potential Legal Responses to Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals, 24 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 289, 290, 300 (1999) (noting the short history of endocrine disruption research 
and the lack of scientific understanding as to the causal mechanisms of endocrine 
disruption or some of the effects therefrom).  
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TSCA’s ability to mandatorily regulate chemicals is effectively 
paralyzed.
93
 Even if some portions of TSCA were fixed, by 
lowering the unreasonable risk threshold, TSCA would likely 
still be paralyzed by our systemic lack of chemical toxicity data. 
As proposed here, the strong precautionary principle would 
actually fix the current regulatory paralysis. By giving industry a 
strong incentive to produce chemical safety data, regulators can 
begin to fill the persistent data gap. In so doing, regulators and 
the public will finally be able to make sensible judgments as to 
what chemical risks can be tolerated and managed. Far from 
paralysis, this regime would actually advance society’s 
understanding of chemical risks and benefits while protecting 
people in the process.  
This is not just theoretical fantasy. The United States already 
uses the principle effectively in other types of protective 
regulations.
94
 Perhaps the best example of this is the drug review 
process of the FDA, The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act,
95
 which presumptively bans the sale of any “drug” in the 
United States outright.
96
 But, the drug can be marketed if the 
manufacturer proves the drug’s safety and effectiveness through 
investigation, such as clinical trials.
97
 In the face of serious 
threats to human health from untested drugs,
98
 the FDA policy 
 
 93. See supra text accompanying note 23. 
 94. See infra note 95.  
 95. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006). The 
original Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 
(1938)) was notably modified in 1962 (the Kefauver Harris Amendment) using the strong 
precautionary principle, to prohibit the marketing of any drug without the FDA’s express 
approval.  
 96. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a). 
 97. Id. § 355(b)-(d); see also Sachs, supra note 8, at 1307–08 (discussing this 
process and the FDA approval process’ embracement of the “strong” precautionary 
principle).  
 98. For example, consider the untested drug Thalidomyde. Thalidomyde was 
marketed as a sleep aid and anti-nausea drug given to expectant mothers to ease 
symptoms associated with morning sickness. See James H. Kim & Anthony R. Scialli, 
Thalidomide: The Tragedy of Birth Defects and the Effective Treatment of Disease, 
TOXICOLOGICAL SCIS, 122, 1 (Apr. 19, 2011), available at http://toxsci.oxfordjournals. 
org/content/122/1/1.full.pdf. Distributed in Britain, Thalidomide was untested and began 
unexpectedly causing serious birth defects. Id. Thalidomide was discontinued in 1962. Id. 
Learning from that experience, the Kefauver Harris Amendment was passed. See Emma 
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implements a particularly strong precautionary regulation—a 
complete ban.
99
 But this strongly precautionary regime allows 
the drug manufacturer to overcome the ban by proving safety 
and effectiveness.
100
 Despite the FDA’s strong precautionary 
regulation, the US pharmaceutical industry remains extremely 
profitable.
101
 The strong precautionary principle hasn’t doomed 
the pharmaceutical industry. Instead, it has provided invaluable 
protection for the public.
102
 The reasonable logic of the strong 
precautionary principle and its successful application by the 
FDA demonstrate its place in a new U.S. chemical regulatory 
scheme.  
B. All Demand and No Supply Makes Jack a Dull Boy  
Perhaps TSCA’s biggest flaw is its insatiable appetite for 
information. As noted earlier, the root of this problem is the 
TSCA’s unreasonable risk burden of proof.103 TSCA requires the 
EPA to produce evidence indicating that a substance presents or 
will present an unreasonable risk to human and environmental 
 
Wilkinson, Thalidomide Survivors to Get £20m, BBC NEWS (Dec. 23, 2009), http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8428838.stm.  
 99. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).  
 100. See id.; see also Sachs, supra note 8, at 1308. 
 101. See Matthew Herper, The Best Drug Companies Of All Time, FORBES (Aug. 3, 
2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2011/08/03/the-best-drug-companies-
of-all-time/ (illustrating the number of drugs approved by the top drug companies of the 
last 60 years, including Merck (which produced vaccines for hepatitis B, measles-
mumps-and-rubella, meningitis, and pneumonia), Pfizer (which produced Lipitor, 
Zithromax, and Viagra), and Eli Lilly (which produced Cymbalta, Prozac, and Gemzar), 
among other household names of Big Pharma). Admittedly, the industry is experiencing 
many difficulties from problems not attributable directly to the strong precautionary 
principle. See John LaMattina, Pharma’s Reputation Continues To Suffer—What Can Be 
Done To Fix It?, FORBES (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/ 
2013/01/18/pharmas-reputation-continues-to-suffer-what-can-be-done-to-fix-it/ (these 
problems include drug affordability, public perceptions of the industry, and a lack of 
transparency regarding negative clinical trials).  
 102. See Legislation, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/regulatory 
information/ legislation/default.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2013) (describing the passage of 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act after a legally marketed elixir, “Elixir 
Sulfanilamide”, killed 107 people, including children, and noting that “The Food and 
Drugs Act of 1906 was the first of more than 200 laws that constitute one of the world's 
most comprehensive and effective networks of public health and consumer protections.”).  
 103. See supra text accompanying notes 23, 24, 26. 
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health before regulation can occur.
104
 Unfortunately, courts have 
interpreted this burden to be so high that the EPA has all but 
stopped regulating new chemicals under the TSCA.
105
  
In Corrosion Proof Fittings,
106
 the Fifth Circuit remanded the 
EPA’s proposed ban on asbestos—effectively ending EPA 
regulation of new chemicals under TSCA.
107
 The court opined 
that under TSCA, the more stringent the EPA regulations, the 
more proof the EPA must provide to justify the regulation.
108
 
With this in mind, the Court concluded that more than “45,000 
pages of analyses, comments, testimony, correspondence, and 
other materials”109 documenting the dangers of asbestos was 
insufficient to justify a complete ban.
110
 Highlighting the 
complexity of TSCA’s requirements, the court also took issue 
with “the manner in which the EPA conducted some of its 
analysis,” the EPA’s failure to prove that an outright ban was the 
least burdensome alternative in regulating asbestos on a use-by-
use basis, and the EPA’s failure to assess the risks posed by 
potential asbestos substitutes.
111
 Given the court’s stringent 
interpretation of the “least burdensome alternative” and cost-
benefit risk analysis requirements of TSCA, the burden of proof 
on the EPA became drastically higher than previously thought.
112
 
The impossibly high burden of proof established in Corrosion 
 
 104. See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a). 
 105. See Corrosion Proof Fittings, Inc. v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991); see 
also Applegate, supra note 8, at 736–37 (2008). 
 106. 947 F.2d 1201. 
 107. Id. at 1207; See Applegate, supra note 8 (describing the halt of mandatory EPA 
chemical restrictions and the defeat of the EPA’s decade-long effort to restrict asbestos); 
John Kvinge, Morally Hazardous Chemical Regulations: Why Effective Reform of the 
TSCA Requires Reduction of the Toxic Data Gap, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 313, 320–
21 (2011) (describing the effect of Corrosion Proof Fittings on EPA attempts to make 
significant rules limiting chemical manufacturing not supported by industry). 
 108. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1220.  
 109. Asbestos: Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce 
Prohibitions, 54 Fed. Reg. 29460, 29461 (July 12, 1989) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 763) 
(this record served as the basis for the EPA’s final rule). 
 110. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1229–30. 
 111. Id. at 1215–30. 
 112. See Franklin, supra note 16, at 11. 
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Proof Fittings has led the EPA to abandon attempts to pursue 
mandatory regulations under Section 6 of TSCA.
113
  
The stringent standards established in Corrosion Proof 
Fittings run up against the stark reality that little to no safety 
information exists for most chemicals currently in use.
114
 For 
instance, the National Research Council’s 1984 report entitled 
“Toxicity Testing” found no toxicity data available for more than 
80% of all toxic substances in commerce.
115
 The report also 
concluded that only 22% of high production volume (HPV) 
chemicals even had a minimum safety data set.
116
 Not much had 
changed by 1997, when the Environmental Defense Fund 
published a study entitled “Toxic Ignorance.”117 The study found 
baseline “Screening Information Data Sets” available for only 
29% of the 100 HPV chemicals they sampled, with the rest of 
the data being absent or incomplete.
118
 Not surprisingly, the 
persistent “data gap” was one of the major reasons for the 
European Commission’s REACH proposal in 2003.119  
 
 113. See id. (asserting that the Corrosion Proof Fittings’ result turned TSCA’s 
mandatory rulemaking authority under section 6 into a “dead letter”); see also Dennison, 
supra note 10, at 10020.  
 114. See infra text accompanying notes 115, 117, 119.  
 115. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, Toxicity Testing: Strategies to Determine Needs 
and Priorities 12 fig.2 (1984), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn= 
0309034337. 
 116. Id. at 310. 
 117. ENVTL. DEF. FUND, Toxic Ignorance: The Continuing Absence of Basic Health 
Testing for Top-Selling Chemicals in the United States (1997), available at 
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/243_toxicignorance.pdf.  
 118. Id. at 15 fig.2-1. (“Screening data sets” are chemical safety information sets 
describing basic safety data pertaining to each chemical tested.) 
 119. Commission Staff Working Paper, Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council Concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restrictions of 
Chemicals (REACH), Establishing a European Chemicals Agency and Amending 
Directive 1999/45/EC and Regulation (EC) [on Persistent Organic Pollutants], Extended 
Impact Assessment, at 26-27, COM (2003) 644 final (Oct. 29, 2003), http://ec.europa.eu/ 
enterprise/sectors/chemicals/files/ reach/eia-sec-2003_1171_en.pdf  
(“The availability of qualified monitoring data on environmental concentrations 
of chemicals is limited, and restricted to persistent organic pollutants (POPs), 
heavy metals and some pesticides. A joint EEA/European Science Foundation 
study on European monitoring of chemicals concluded that: ‘Monitoring is 
partial, uncoordinated, sometimes out of date, and, on many occasions, 
irrelevant to current policy needs; centralised knowledge about chemical 
monitoring activities that are conducted for different purposes is incomplete; 
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With a lack of chemical data and a huge demand for 
information prior to regulation, the EPA has rarely asserted any 
mandatory chemical regulations under TSCA.
120
 This experience 
shows that a new chemical regulation regime must require 
significantly less information prior to regulatory decision-
making. At the same time, the amount of chemical information 
available must increase.  
III. ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS OF A NEW CHEMICAL REGIME 
With TSCA reform being a realistic possibility in the near 
term, it is important that legislators consider the elements that 
have made TSCA such a failure and REACH a relative success. 
A new regime can improve upon both, but fundamental changes 
must be made to the US approach to chemical regulation. 
First, a new system must regulate proactively, not 
retroactively. The system must require chemical manufacturers 
to ask for permission to manufacture safe chemicals, not 
forgiveness from ex post facto harm caused by untested 
chemicals. This can best be achieved by embracing the “strong 
precautionary principle” in chemical regulation. Second, 
chemical data generation must be a primary goal of a new 
regulatory regime. The regime must be structured to require less 
chemical safety data prior to regulatory action. The “strong 
precautionary principle,” data generation incentives for industry, 
and a lower regulatory burden of proof will help narrow the 
existing “data gap.” Third, such a scheme must be transparent, 
 
there is a lack of integrated exposure assessments that consider all relevant 
exposure routes; [and] there are huge data gaps in information on chemical 
exposures and impacts, especially concerning vulnerable groups and ecosystems 
. . .’”) (internal citations omitted).  
 120. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Chemical Regulation: Options for 
Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Toxic Substances Control Act 10 n.3 (2009), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/121612.pdf (explaining the flaws of TSCA and 
inability to regulate asbestos under TSCA). After all, “if the EPA can’t ban a known 
carcinogen, at which no level of exposure is safe, how can EPA regulate any toxic 
substance?” See also Asbestos: Think Again: Asbestos is Still Not Banned, ENVTL. 
WORKING GROUP (Mar. 4, 2004), available at http://www.ewg.org/research/asbestos-
think-again/asbestos-still-not-banned. 
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with an easily accessed, publicly available chemical safety 
database subject to peer review. Fourth, there must also be an 
administrative appeals process whereby permitting decisions 
may be challenged. And finally, the scheme must be responsive 
to the practical realities of data generation and the imposition of 
new constraints on industry. Standards for acceptable techniques 
such as “read-across” and staggered phase-in requirements for 
chemical manufacturing permits can help achieve these goals. 
A. Make Industry Ask For Permission, Not Forgiveness 
A new chemical regulatory scheme must require chemical 
manufacturers to receive EPA permission before producing and 
selling their products without regulatory obstacles. As evidenced 
by TSCA’s performance thus far, a scheme that puts the initial 
regulatory burden on the EPA is ineffective.
121
 Scholars have 
pointed to reasons why this is particularly problematic in the 
context of chemical regulation.
122
 For instance, there is little 
understanding of the complex mechanisms by which chemicals 
work and interact in the body, the safe levels of exposure for 
these chemicals, the synergistic qualities of these chemicals, or 
their long-term and intergenerational effects.
123
 If the EPA lacks 
an adequate understanding of these critical components, then the 
EPA cannot possibly determine safe levels of exposure for these 
chemicals. If a chemical regulatory system is to protect human 
and environmental health, this information must be obtained 
somehow. By putting the burden of producing this information 
on chemical producers, those most equipped and able to produce 
this information—the chemical industry—have a tremendous 
incentive to do so.  
This type of licensing-based model is used in many major 
federal environmental statutes, such as the Clean Water Act and 
 
 121. See Denison, supra note 10, at 10020. See also Applegate supra note 8, at 736–
37 (describing difficulty of putting initial burden on EPA); see also Watnick, supra note 
6, at 1325–26 (explaining the difficulties of this model in the context of EDCs).  
 122. See, e.g., Watnick article, supra note 6, at 1325–26; Sachs supra note 8. 
 123. See Watnick, supra note 6, at 1325–26. 
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the Clean Air Act.
124
 In both regimes, environmental and human 
health is protected by a permitting scheme that generally requires 
emitters of air pollutants and dischargers of effluent to 
implement certain safety measures before they can emit or 
discharge air pollutants and effluent.
125
 Both regimes also require 
safety assurances from the regulated, such as technology-based 
pollution controls, and define the relevant acceptable safety 
standards.
126
 These schemes offer useful starting points for how a 
new chemical permitting regime could operate using elements of 
the precautionary principle.
127
 Similarly, the FDA’s drug 
approval process provides a model for using the strong 
precautionary principle in a licensing scheme.
128
 While the 
activities being regulated are different,
129
 this method of 
regulation could be directly adopted by a new chemical regime. 
The central question is how serious the default regulations of 
a chemical should be under a strong precautionary regime. Based 
on a more stringent view, the default action could be a presumed 
prohibition on all chemicals without accompanying baseline 
safety data.
130
 Alternatively, each chemical could be limited to a 
certain level of production (for instance, 25,000 tons per year, or 
a quarter of what is normally considered an HPV chemical) until 
 
 124. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 7661(a) (2006). 
 125. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 7661(a) (2006); see also 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1311, 1314, 1316 (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7471, 7475, 7503 (2006).  
 126. 33 U.S.C. § 1342; 42 U.S.C. § 7661(a); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314, 1316; 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7471 (explaining statutory requirements for emitters and dischargers under the 
Acts). 
 127. The Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act are not exact blueprints for reformed 
chemical regulation in the US. However, we can learn and improve upon our regulatory 
regimes based on our experiences with the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act and 
EPA’s utilization of them. These laws represent important precautionary models of 
regulation in the form of permitting processes.  
 128. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399, §355(a)-(d). 
 129. For instance, drugs are marketed and sold to be directly administered to humans 
in order to alter a set of biological factors in the consumer. In contrast, chemicals are 
marketed and sold for a number of purposes not limited to human consumption or 
exposure, and if exposure occurs, the amounts and effects can vary drastically. See 
generally Watnick, supra note 6 (describing the variance in reactions to chemical 
exposure with emphasis on endocrine disruptors).  
 130. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (using the example of FDA regulations for drug 
approval). 
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baseline data is available for the chemical.
131
 A weaker regime 
could simply require warning labels, or impose marketing and 
use restrictions on all chemicals lacking baseline data. The ideal 
default regulatory response of this system would likely fall 
somewhere between mandating warning labels and a complete 
prohibition of the offending chemicals—perhaps a production 
limit on individual chemicals. 
Embracing the general framework of the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act and the permitting structures of the Clean Water 
and Clean Air Acts,
132
 a new scheme should impose significant 
restrictions on the manufacture and sale of a given chemical until 
baseline safety information is provided by industry.
133
 Once this 
information is provided, the government should have a certain 
amount of time to decide whether the chemical is permissible or 
whether further testing is required.
134
 Depending on the quantity 
of the chemical produced and the dangers posed by it,
135
 the 
 
 131. This particular regulatory strategy would guard against any HPV chemicals 
failing to have significant amounts of chemical data available for them. Scholars in the 
field have suggested the same or similar precautionary default responses, as well. See 
REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 32, at 7 (establishing this volume-based regulatory 
mechanism). 
 132. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301399 (FDCA); 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (CWA); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7661(a) (CAA); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314, 1316 (CWA requirements); 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7471, 7475, 7503 (CAA requirements). This sort of chemical regulatory structure is 
not a novel idea. Others have suggested that this regulatory system can be an effective 
means of regulating chemicals while encouraging their safe use and development of 
relevant safety data. See Watnick, supra note 6, at 1331–32. 
 133. Presumptive prohibition of a chemical is certainly a strongly precautionary 
regulatory measure, but it may be too much. Unless the level of data required in order to 
satisfy the baseline safety data requirements of a new chemical regulatory scheme was 
low enough that compliance with the regime was reasonable for industry, this type of 
regulatory measure may be too strong, unlikely to achieve a broad political consensus, or 
simply impractical. Instead, the regime could impose other strong measures such as 
production or sales limits on particular chemicals. For instance, if chemical data is not 
offered in satisfaction of the regime’s requirements, sales of the chemical could be 
limited to 50% of the total volume of the chemical sold the year prior to the regime’s 
enactment.  
 134. A safety evaluation by the government could mirror that which is carried out by 
REACH. See REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 32, at 11–14. The timeline of approvals could 
also operate in a similar fashion to that of REACH. Id. at 6–9. 
 135. Aside from the concerns that arise after chemical testing, the EPA could use 
criteria such as: (1) neurotoxic effects from the chemical; (2) persistent, bioaccumulative, 
and toxic qualities (“PBT”) posed by the chemical; (3) probable or known carcinogenic 
effects of the chemical; (4) the chemical’s use in children’s products; (5) the chemical’s 
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regime could demand higher levels of information beyond 
baseline safety data.
136
 Along these lines, the EPA should have 
the ability to impose harsher restrictions on these VHC and HPV 
chemicals. For such a scheme to work successfully, a new 
regime should also abandon the “least burdensome alternative” 
requirement imposed by TSCA.
137
 As evidenced by the decision 
of Corrosion Proof Fittings, this requirement can severely 
undermine the EPA’s ability to reasonably regulate harmful 
chemicals.
138
  
There is one major caveat to imposing such a regime. 
Implementing the strong precautionary principle prior to 
exposure is impossible for much of the existing chemical 
universe, because both safe and unsafe chemicals are already 
being used in the United States. Requiring permits immediately 
for all existing chemicals in use would seriously disrupt the 
chemical market. To avoid this, a staggered set of deadlines 
would need to accompany this regime.
139
 Using these dates, the 
regime’s requirements could be phased in to allow manufacturers 
ample time to collect baseline chemical data for their products.
140
 
 
possible or actual effects on children’s health; and (6) the detection of the chemical in 
biomonitoring programs as ways to prioritize chemicals for testing. The EPA has used 
these criteria in a recent work plan under TSCA to select chemicals for comprehensive 
risk assessments. See Capital Report: EPA Studies Toxic Chemicals in Consumer 
Products, AM. ASS’N FOR JUSTICE, Feb. 2014, at 56; TSCA Work Plan Chemicals, ENV. 
PROT. AGENCY (last accessed June 8, 2015), http://www.epa.gov/oppt/existingchemicals/ 
pubs/workplans.html. 
 136. This idea is generally implemented in REACH. See REACH IN BRIEF, supra 
note 32, at 6-8. It is important to note that industry representatives frequently oppose this 
proposition. Industry typically objects to the idea of allowing the EPA to require 
substantial chemical testing without any limit on what the EPA can ultimately ask for. 
See generally Testimony of Cal Dooley, “Legislative Hearing on the Safe Chemicals 
Act” (Nov. 17, 2011), transcript available at http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index. 
cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=a76a48ca-e5ca-4239-a80b-5db168b27898. If 
this component is to be added to a new chemical regime, an ultimate limit on what the 
EPA may require from industry before taking regulatory action should be specified as 
well. Should the chemical manufacturer object to the regulatory action at that point, an 
appeals process could provide them with an arena to seek redress.  
 137. See supra note 24. 
 138. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1220. 
 139. REACH creates a similar scheme of requirements, accompanied by “sunset 
dates” by which compliance must be attained. See REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 32, at 9. 
 140. For instance, the chemicals for which we currently have safety data could be 
assigned the earliest dates and the chemicals for which we have incomplete or no data 
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These dates could also be staggered in order to prioritize the 
more pressing threats posed by VHC and HPV chemicals.
141
 
Regardless of the exact parameters of such a regime, the 
indispensable element is the responsibility of manufacturers to 
prove the safety of their products before production rather than 
placing the burden on government to prove their dangers. The 
surest way of accomplishing this is by implementing strong 
precaution.  
B. Priority #1: Generating Chemical Data To Feed A 
Reasonable Statutory Appetite  
The so called “data gap” in chemical regulation is well 
documented.
142
 As scholarship and TSCA experience 
demonstrate, a new chemical regime must generate significant 
amounts of chemical data.
143
 An effective regime must also 
narrow the “data gap” by limiting its demand for chemical 
information prior to regulation.
144
  
The data creation priorities of a new system should be driven 
primarily by the “strong precautionary principle” and industry 
incentives.
145
 Assuming, for instance, that the scheme 
presumptively prohibits the manufacture of all chemicals without 
a baseline amount of safety data, the industry would have a 
strong incentive to develop data for “unknown” chemicals.146 
But even if the scheme’s presumptive action was not so severe—
for instance, a production limit or mandatory warning label—the 
 
could be delayed. In addition, chemicals of “Very High Concern” could receive earlier 
sunset deadlines, as they do in REACH. Id.  
 141. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 119, at 10–11 
(describing the various phases of REACH implementation). 
 142. See Applegate, supra note 9, at 1395–96, 1407; see generally Kvinge, supra 
note 107.  
 143. See generally Applegate, supra note 9 (describing the data gap); Watnick, supra 
note 6; see also supra note 16, at 12). 
 144. See generally Applegate, supra note 9 (same as above). 
 145. These do not necessarily represent the only mechanisms that should be used to 
“fill the gap” and generate chemical safety data. However, these two components are 
critically important to any new chemical regime.  
 146. This generally operates in the same fashion as REACH’s “No Data, No Market” 
principle. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.  
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incentive would remain. Requiring levels of data beyond 
baseline safety data for HPV and VHC chemicals could also 
allow the EPA to emphasize safety information on the chemicals 
we most need to know about.
147
 Specific incentives for industry 
could be put in place, as well. For instance, some scholars have 
proposed limiting toxic tort liabilities for torts arising from use 
of chemicals that go through complete testing.
148
 Manufacturers 
who create safer substitutes (with complete testing data) for 
existing chemicals could be rewarded as an incentive.
149
  
A new chemical regulatory scheme must also be able to 
operate on less chemical information, or a “narrower” data 
gap.
150
 If default regulations are imposed on all chemicals 
without baseline safety data, regulatory paralysis can be 
effectively avoided. The chemical regime would be doing its 
job—protecting the public and environment from known and 
unknown chemical harms as a default—while leaving the door 
open for industry to prove its chemicals safe and enjoy the 
profits from them. Should further regulation be needed after 
safety data is obtained, the data gap can be narrowed further by 
lowering the burden of proof that the government must meet in 
order to act. For instance, rather than TSCA’s unreasonable risk 
standard,
151
 a new chemical regime should impose a lesser 
burden of proof, such as the “potential harm” standard used in 
the Canadian Environmental Protection Act.
152
 Another 
 
 147. This regulatory strategy also appears in REACH. See REACH IN BRIEF, supra 
note 32, at 6–14. This proposition assumes that risk is calculated as chemical potency 
multiplied by exposure.  
 148. Kvinge, supra note 107, at 330; see also Robert B. Haemer, Reform of the Toxic 
Substances Control Act: Achieving Balance in the Regulation of Toxic Substances, 6 
ENVTL. L. 99, 133 (1999).  
 149. See generally Wendy E. Wagner, Using Competition-Based Regulation to 
Bridge the Toxics Data Gap, 83 IND. L.J. (2008).  
 150. See Applegate, supra note 9, at 1407. 
 151. See 15 U.S.C. § 2605. 
 152. Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 S.C. 1999, c. 33 § 73, available 
at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-15.31/FullText.html (a lesser burden of proof 
could, for example, be based on the CEPA’s potential harm caused model rather than on 
existing or imminent exposure). See also Denison, supra note 10, at 10022. Denison 
makes a useful comparison with Canada’s CEPA § 64, which allows for regulation to be 
triggered by a chemical being labeled “CEPA-toxic.” Id. The chemical must not be 
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alternative could be using the “reasonable certainty of no harm” 
standard that is already applied to food-use pesticides and 
drugs.
153
 Combined with incentives to create more chemical 
safety data, this regime could do more with less and with greater 
frequency.  
C. Transparency in the Process  
A new chemical scheme should also be publicly accessible 
and include a system for appeal.
154
 Creating a publicly available 
database of chemical safety data would serve many useful 
purposes. First, the database would directly protect the public by 
providing chemical safety information for it to use.
155
 With 
readily available safety data, consumers can make safer 
decisions about the chemicals to which they are exposed.
156
 
 
definitively found to be toxic, however. Instead, this label can apply to chemicals that 
cause concern either because of their level of exposure or their hazardous properties. Id.  
 153. See Franklin, supra note 16, at 12. 
 154. One example of the creation of a useful toxic chemical database is the Toxics 
Release Inventory (“TRI”). The TRI was mandated by Congress in 1986 as a database 
where industrial facilities were required to report the release of particular chemicals into 
the environment. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 
§ 313, 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2000); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-260-R-002-004, 
HOW ARE THE TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY DATA USED? (2003), available at 
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/ documents/2003_TRI_Data_Uses_report.pdf. 
After the TRI’s creation, the EPA reported that covered industrial facilities reduced their 
releases of TRI chemicals by forty-four percent between 1988 and 1994. Toxic Chemical 
Release Reporting, 61 Fed. Reg. 51,322 (Oct. 1, 1996) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 372). An 
Environmental Defense Fund analysis of the TRI attributes its success entirely to the 
influence of public disclosure of this information. DAVID ROE ET AL., ENVTL. DEF. FUND, 
TOXIC IGNORANCE: THE CONTINUING ABSENCE OF BASIC HEALTH TESTING FOR TOP-
SELLING CHEMICALS IN THE UNITED STATES 36 (1997). Scholars have advocated for this 
same type of database to be created as part of a new chemical regulatory system before. 
See Watnick, supra note 6, at 1331. 
 155. See supra note 154. 
 156. Similar consumer-awareness devices are commonly used tools by consumers 
searching for information on the quality, consumer satisfaction, and safety of consumer 
goods. See Gwendolyn Bounds, Meet the Sticklers, WALL ST. J. (May 5, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703866704575224093100014240.html#
mod=todays_us_personal_ journal (noting Consumer Reports’ 7.3 million subscribers for 
print and Web publications); see also Ben Fox, WebMD Net up on Higher Visitors; 
Outlook Weaker, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/ 
webmd-net-up-on-higher-visitors-outlook-weaker-2011-11-02 (noting that despite falling 
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Second, with access to this data, consumers can pressure 
industry actors to use safer chemicals in manufacturing 
processes.
157
 A recent example of effective consumer pressure is 
the public backlash against the use of bisphenol A (BPA). The 
public outcry against the use of BPA caused the Campbell Soup 
Company to declare that it was going “BPA free” in the near 
future.
158
 Third, a public chemical database can be peer reviewed 
so that chemical data can be scrutinized for accuracy. Not only 
will a public chemical database provide a safety-net for chemical 
testing, but it will incentivize industry to conduct proper safety 
testing so as to avoid public backlash from publishing faulty 
data.
159
 
D. Two Bites at the Apple 
An appeals system where government conclusions regarding 
chemical safety can be challenged should accompany the 
establishment of a public database.
160
 If government can regulate 
in the absence of scientific certainty, industry should be able to 
appeal a safety ruling if new evidence suggests a chemical is safe 
under certain conditions.
161
 On the other hand, interested parties 
such as citizen groups should also be able to challenge 
 
revenues for the company, WebMD reported 107.3 million unique monthly visitors on 
average, with 2.24 billion page views in total in 2011).  
 157. Industry and retail responses to consumer demands have been demonstrated in a 
number of settings. For example, restaurants have increasingly begun to post “calorie 
counts” on their menus as a result of consumer demands to know the nutrition content of 
the foods they purchase. See Stephanie Strom, McDonald’s Menu to Post Calorie Data, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/13/business/mcdonalds-
to-start-posting-calorie-counts.html. See also infra text accompanying note 158. 
 158. Jon Entine, Op-Ed., Campbell’s Big Fat Green BPA Lie—And The 
Sustainability Activists That Enabled It, FORBES (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.forbes. 
com/sites/jonentine/2012/09/18/campbells-big-fat-green-bpa-lie-and-the-sustainability-
activists-that-enabled-it/. Entine’s piece describes Campbell’s interesting predicament: 
there was no readily available substitute for BPA in their manufacturing process, but 
Campbell’s nonetheless made the “BPA free” declaration to appease the public. Id.  
 159. Id.  
 160. Articles 91, 92, and 93 provide corollaries for this idea in REACH. See 
REACH, arts. 91–93. Certain decisions under these articles can be appealed to the Board 
of Appeal of the ECHA. Id.  
 161. This could operate in a similar fashion to REACH’s re-registration principles 
that require the constant retesting and re-evaluation of chemicals. See REACH, art. 91. 
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affirmative safety findings from the permitting process if 
credible evidence exists to the contrary.
162
 Ideally, this would 
allow the peer review function of the chemical database to 
meaningfully re-examine and challenge potentially faulty 
chemical testing data. This appeals system should also move 
away from the “substantial evidence” standard applied by TSCA, 
and instead embrace the deferential “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard under the Administrative Procedures Act.
163
 Such a 
change would make the appeals process more familiar and 
understandable for all parties involved.  
E. Understanding Reality 
Although multinational firms have been adapting to the 
constraints of REACH since its enactment, a new US scheme 
would have significant impacts. Any requirement of producing 
massive amounts of chemical safety data will certainly be a 
major shock to the chemical industry.
164
 For instance, when 
REACH demanded chemical testing information from 
companies marketing chemicals in the European Union, firms 
 
 162. Such citizen actions could take a form similar to those allowed for in the Clean 
Water and Clean Air acts. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006). 
 163. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)(2012); see also Franklin, supra note 16, at 13 
(advocating for the same change in standards of review).  
 164. For instance, when REACH was initially proposed, industry officials lamented 
the new costs it imposed. See Harvey Black, Chemical Reaction: The U.S. Response to 
REACH, 116 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A124, A125–27 (2008), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ pmc/articles/PMC2265068/. Black explains that American 
companies “are not crazy about REACH but . . . they also recognize that it is a set of 
regulations they have to live with if they wish to do business in Europe.” Id. at A127. On 
the other hand, Black also notes that U.S. companies like Dow Chemical have been 
supportive of the REACH regulations:  
“Dow Chemical Company stated on its “Dow and REACH” website 
(http://www.dow.com/reach/) that the new policy “represents a significant 
opportunity for chemicals manufacturers, their suppliers, and customers to work 
together to protect the environment and preserve the future of the chemicals 
industry in Europe.” 
Id. at A127. According to Dow spokesman Mark Walton, the REACH regulations will 
create a “more favorable and sustainable business climate for Dow and the chemical 
industry.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
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faced steep testing and registration costs.
165
 One estimate puts 
the cost of screening a single chemical compound at $250,000–
$300,000.
166
 REACH has resulted in testing problems due to the 
regulation’s demand for data.167 For instance, many of the safety 
information dossiers submitted for authorization by the European 
Union contained faulty testing information and conclusions.
168
 
Some errors have been attributed to overreliance on a frequently-
used technique called “read-across,” which is used to allow 
safety inferences to be made between similar chemicals.
169
 
Because of the subjective nature of the technique, data precision 
has emerged as a problem under REACH.
170
 Opponents of 
animal testing have also voiced concerns that calls for significant 
amounts of chemical toxicity data will cause major increases in 
animal testing.
171
 Certain assurances can be made to minimize 
animal testing, but the avoidance altogether of animal testing 
seems impossible.
172
 Finally, the data produced through chemical 
 
 165. See REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 32, at 16 (in its “Extended Impact 
Assessment,” the European Commission estimated the costs of REACH to the chemicals 
industry at a total of € 2.3 billion over the first 11 years following the Regulation’s entry 
into force.); Rachel Massey, Surviving REACH: A Guide for Companies that Use 
Chemicals 11 (2005), available at http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/Surviving 
Reach.pdf (noting that REACH’s compliance costs equate to about .04% of average 
annual sales across the chemicals industry); see also REACH Chemical Law ‘Worth the 
Money in the End’, Says BASF, EURAACTIV (Mar. 9, 2012, 07:39 AM), http://www. 
euractiv.com/sustainability/reach-chemical-law-worth-money-b-news-514565 (quoting 
Ronald Drews, vice president for chemical regulations and trade control at BASF, 
estimating REACH costs at an average of €50 million per year). 
 166. E. RESEARCH GRP., prepared for U.S. EPA, SUMMARY OF THE WORKSHOP ON 
THE ENDOCRINE DISRUPTOR SCREENING PROGRAM 2–7 (Dec. 27, 2007), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/endo/meetings/121708minutes.pdf (this estimate was put forward by 
Richard Becker of the American Chemistry Council). 
 167. See Natasha Gilbert, Data Gaps Threaten Chemical Safety Law, NATURE (July 
12, 2011), http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110712/full/475150a.html.  
 168. Id. 
 169. Id.; see also Thomas Hartung & Costanza Rovida, Chemical Regulators Have 
Overreached, NATURE, 460, at 1080 (Aug. 2009), available at http://www.researchgate. 
net/publication/26773780_Chemical_regulators_have_overreached?ev=prf_pub  (explaining 
the difficulties in obtaining consistently high quality data and the shortcomings of relied-
upon testing techniques).  
 170. See Hartungs & Rovida, supra note 169, at 1080. 
 171. See REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 32, at 4–7. 
 172. Id. 
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testing frequently rests on subjective assumptions and decision-
making among scientists.
173
  
In a new chemical regime, regulators must be mindful of 
these realities. While strong precaution and data generation must 
be the primary goals of a new regime, it must also be sensitive to 
the difficulties of producing chemical information reliably.
174
 To 
assist the industry, a new regime should provide guidance on 
chemical testing methods and work with manufacturers to share 
best practices.
175
 For instance, a new chemical regime could 
provide standards and guidance as to the appropriateness of 
“read-across” conclusions and encourage the peer review of such 
conclusions to ensure the efficiency and integrity of chemical 
testing. A set of staggered “sunset deadlines” for the chemical 
industry could also help to ease the transition into regulation for 
chemical firms. And in demanding this data, regulators must be 
mindful of protecting the confidential business information 
provided to them by industry.  
Regulators in such a chemical regime should see their role 
not only as protectors of the public and the environment, but as 
important actors in a system charged with advancing useful 
chemicals to the market. Instead of viewing a chemical 
regulatory system as a hurdle standing in the way of chemical 
sales, regulators and market participants should view it as a way 
by which we promote the use and sale of safe and helpful 
chemicals. After all, chemicals are undoubtedly useful in our 
lives and indispensable to them.   
 
 173. See Watnick, supra note 6, at 1320.  
 174. These difficulties are readily apparent from the chemical industry’s experiences 
with REACH, and amount not only to monetary difficulties, but also scientific difficulties 
in the testing process itself. See supra text accompanying notes 164–65, 169.  
 175. Similar guidelines and standards have been used in environmental regulations. 
See Reach In Brief supra note 32, at 7 (describing the general rules set out by REACH 
for “read across” and “Quantitative Structure Activity Relationship” testing procedures).  
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CONCLUSION 
In its unfortunate history, TSCA has failed to accomplish 
much of what it set out to do. One needs only to look to 
Corrosion Proof Fittings to recognize the failure of TSCA to 
effectively regulate harmful chemicals.
176
 Yet TSCA has a very 
important job—protecting unsuspecting American consumers 
from unreasonable risks to their health and environment due to 
chemical exposure. Chemical safety reform should be a top 
priority for any responsible legislator.  
There are a few critical components that must be embraced in 
a new US chemical regime. A new regime should be founded on 
the strong precautionary principle and should prioritize chemical 
data production and regulatory mechanisms that function in the 
absence of scientific certainty. In addition, the regime should 
have flexible appeal mechanisms and provide public access to a 
transparent chemical safety database. Finally, the regime must 
acknowledge the realities of chemical testing and maintain 
reasonable expectations of the regulatory system and its demands 
on industry. This is by no means a comprehensive set of 
recommendations for chemical reform. But, it provides some key 
principles that should be considered when the US chemical 
regulatory system is finally overhauled. For the sake of 
Americans and their environment, hopefully that day comes 
soon.  
 
 176. See supra notes 105–13.  
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